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Chapter pages in book: (p. 45 - 62)EFFECTS OF WAR FINANCING ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
By the end of the fourth year of war Canada had organized her
economy so that half her gross national product was being devoted
to the war effort. This accomplishment was implemented half by
borrowing from institutions and individuals and half by taxing
them, and has had ramifications throughout the nation's entire
financial system. As a result of this change from the normal pro-
cedures of peacetime, the economic position of institutions and in-
dividuals has been profoundly altered. Some effects of these changes
are already discernible after four years of war, and they suggest
emerging financial problems, although it is too early to state what
the ultimate effects will be.
On the Bank of Canada
The most pronounced effect of the war on the Bank of Canada has
been its rapid growth —inassets and liabilities, personnel, and re-
sponsibilities. On the asset side, increased holdings of government
securities dominate the picture; they have grown from 38 percent
to 95 percent of total central bank assets as a consequence of the sale
of gold and foreign exchange to the FECB and of the acquisition of
government securities in the open market. On the liability side, the
biggest increase has been in notes in circulation. The chief develop-
ment of the balance sheet items is shown in Table 14.
Chartered bank deposits with the Bank of Canada have fluctuated
TABLE 14— PRINCIPAL BALANCE SHE
AUGUST 31, 1939 AND 1943
(dollar figures in millions)
















TOTAL ASSETS 433 1,206 773 179
Notes in circulation 180 41.6








Source: Bank of Canada, Monthly Statements (August 31, 1939 and 1943).
45between $195millionand $315million,with a rising trend over the
war period. Both the fluctuations and the' genral increase result
from the central bank policy of assisting chartered banks to meet
varying demands for credit, without disturbing the customary re-
serve ratio. Increases in these deposits usually reflect bank subscrip-
tions to special war issues, or seasonal increases in the demand for
agricultural credit. Government deposits with the Bank of Canada
have fluctuated between $25 million and $243 million, but in the
main they have exceeded $6o million only for short periods im-
mediately following the sale of new issues of government obliga-
tions.
The staff of the Bank has more than trebled during the war.
This expansion reflects the growing responsibilities of the Bank, and
is accounted for mainly by the Bank's assistance in issuing and
servicing war bonds.
Exchange control makes decisions concerning rediscount and open
market policy somewhat less dependent on short-term movements
in the balance of payments than they were under the gold standard,
and regulation off foreign exchange transactions is not likely to be
abandoned as soon as the war is over. The administrative advantages
of separating foreign exchange control from other aspects of central
bank operations have been clearly demonstrated by wartime exper-
ience, and it seems highly probable that the present division of
functions between the Bank of Canada and the Foreign Exchange
Control Board will continue after the war.
In the Speech from the Throne opening the 1944Sessionof
Parliament, the Prime Minister foreshadowed another new task for
the Bank of Canada as a result of wartime developments. The gov-
ernment feels that reconversion of war plants and expansion of
small and medium-size enterprises will require "new credit facili-
ties for both fixed and working capital" in the postwar period. Ac-
cordingly, it proposes to set up an Industrial Development Bank, as
a subsidiary of the Bank of Canada. The proposed new Bank will
have capital of $25 million subscribed by the Bank of Canada, and
power to borrow $75 million more. It will make loans only to con-
cerns unable to obtain adequate funds from the chartered banks or
other sources, but unlike the American Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, it will not attempt to rescue firms in distress. Its poli-
46 ,cies will be guided by a board of fifteen, with the Governor of the
Bank of Canada as president.
On the Chartered Banks
In the balance sheets of chartered banks, holdings of government
bonds have increased on the one side and deposits on the other.
Government securities have grown from 33 to 46 percent of total
assets, while Canadian loans have fallen from 28 to 22 percent of the
total.
The course of bank lending in Canada has not been uniform for
all types of borrowers, as Table 15 shows. It is particularly interest-
TABLE 15—CLASSIFICATION OF CHARTERED BANK LOANS,





Prov. andAgri- Financial Manu-









1938 $1,059 $137 $149 $121 $129 $214 $134 $39
1939 1,144 131 268 109 111 193 134 46
1940 1,185 114 289 102 105 244 139 52
1941 1,275 87 840 108 106 289 156 50
1942 1,106 71 340 84 64 256 123 49




12.9% 14.1% 11.4% 12.2% 20.2% 12.7% 3.7%
1939 100 11.5 23.4 9.5 9.7 16.9 11.7 4.0
1940 100 9.6 24.4 8.6 8.9 20.6 11.7 4.4
1941 100 6.8 26.7 8.5 8.3 22.7 12.2 3.9
1942 100 6.4 30.7 7.6 5.8 23.1 11.1 4.4
1943 100 4.9 27.5 9.3 6.2 28.1 9.3 4.2
Source:Bank ofCanada, Statistical Summary (December 1942-January1943 and
Decemter 1943-January 1944).
ing to note that despite the heavy borrowing by the government,
loans to individuals against securities, far from increasing, have ac-
tually fallen. Dull stock markets have led to a reduced volume of
other types of financial loans, while improved tax collections and
relatively stable expenditures have diminished the dpendence of
provincial and municipal governments upon the banks. Merchan-
dising loans rose considerably up to 1941, but in 1942 limitations
47on consumption reduced them below their prewar level. During the
early part of the war, plant construction raised the demand for con-
struction loans, and during the last three years shown, these, too, be-
gan to contract. Manufacturing shows some increase in borrowing,
especially in 1940and'943.
By far the biggest increase has been in agricultural credit. This
development comes almost entirely from the increase in wheat carry-
over, which rose from 103millionbushels on August 1,1939 to424
millionbushels on August 1,1942 andGoi million bushels on Au-
gust 1,1943, andthen fell to 355 million by the end of the year.
However, the facts that many agricultural products do not come
under the ceiling and that agricultural prices have risen more than
the average may have made the volume of agricultural credit some-
what higher than it would have been if these conditions had not
obtained.
The total number of deposit accounts and their distribution by
•size has been fairly stable during the war, but the number of de-
posits above $ioo,ooo shows much the greatest growth(Table 16).
Onthe other hand, there has been a distinct shift in the distribu-
tion of the total volume of deposits by size class. Deposits above
$ioo,ooo show the biggest increase in both absolute and percentage
terms. The percentage growth within the $i,ooo and under, and the
$25,000-loo,000,bracketshas been much the same, while the value
of accounts between $i,ooo and $25,000showslittle change. The
growth in number of accounts has been mainly in notice deposits,
but the growth involumehas been mainly in demand deposits.
Since checks may be written against Canadian "notice" deposits
within reasonable limits, few individuals require demand deposits
for their personal affairs. It is a fair assumption that demand de-
posits above $5,000aremainly business deposits, and that demand
deposits above $ioo,ooo are almost certainly of this category. Thus
it appears that the rise in deposits consists to a large extent of work-
ing balances and to a more limited extent of special cash reserves of
business firms. Recent surveys by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System suggest similar developments in the United
States although the American statistics on ownership of deposits by
size are not so complete. Since deposits above $ioo,ooo have in-
creased more than total bank loans, it is obvious that growth of these







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.from bank loans to business. Bank debits have more than kept pace
with volume of deposits, and the velocity of circulation shows a 10
to 15 percent rise during the war.38
Despite the growth of assets, the increasing concentration in gov-
ernment bonds together with higher taxes has resulted in a decline
in total profits of banks, as illustrated in Table i7. While the war
TABLE 17 —PROFITS OF CHARTERED BANKS, l93942a
(in thousands)
Item 1939 1940 1941 1942
Profit before taxes $21,858 $24,627 $25,644 $26,271
Dominion and Provincial taxes 5,168 8,086 9,121 10,455b
Profit after taxes 16,690 16,541 16,523 15,816
Other charges 3,258 3,526 3,535 3,556
Applicable to stock 13,432 13,015 12,988 12,260
Source: Bank of Canada.
aNofigures available for Barclays Bank.
b Of which $312,000 is refundable.
lasts, the banks will be called upon to invest still more in new is-
sues of government obligations. After the war, individuals and non-
financial corporations may wish to convert their holdings of war
loans into cash. If this conversion should reach large proportions,
and if the government feels that it cannot allow the market value
of its obligations to be undermined, the banking system may be
obliged to buy government obligations in sufficient quantities to
maintain market values. Under these circumstances, the proportion
of total bank assets represented by holdings of Dominion securities
would rise still further. The ratio of bank earnings to total assets
would tend to fall until it approximated the average yield on gov-
ernment obligations of maturities commonly held by banks. Of
course, given continued growth of total assets, profits on stock-
holders' investment might still increase.
The costs of bank operations have been rising, and should they
38 Official DBS figures for velocity of circulation of bank deposits (Bank Debits to mdi-
vidual Accounts and Equation of Exchange) are as follows:
First 8 Months
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
Velocity: 8.95 9.09 919 10.21 9.94
50go up more rapidly than earnings, the banks may have to choose
among various possible changes in practice, such as revoking the
privilege of writing checks against notice deposits, lowering the rate
of interest paid on notice deposits, increasing bank service charges,
and cutting salaries and dividends. Most banks cut divi&nds on
1942earnings.
During the war, Treasury finance has become an increasingly
important source of bank income. A growing share of banks' rev-
enues consists of interest on government securities, and of commis-
sions for handling foreign exchange, for delivering war bonds and
for costs incurred in "coupon banking" in connection with ration-
ing.39 In fact, the coordination of banking operations with govern-
ment finance is even more noticeable in this war than it was in
World War I, and it will be remembered that this close relationship
did not entirely disappear after the last war was over.49
On the Supply of Money
During the first four years of war, the total supply of money in
Canada increased at an average monthly rate of i .i percent, as op-
posed to 1.4 percent in the United States.4' However, since notice
deposits carry a limited checking privilege in Canada, they are essen-
tially a part of the circulating medium and are about equal in vol-
ume to demand deposits. Accordingly, the relative strength of in-
flationary tendencies is more accurately shown by a comparison of
total Canadian money supply with the circulating medium in the
United States.42 .The growth of money supply in both countries is
illustrated in Chart V, and it will be noted that the average monthly
29 House of Commons Debates (March 24, 1945) p. 1526.
40 Some readers may be inclined to ask what bearing war finance has had on the ques-
tion of complete nationalization of the banking system, especially since the growing
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation party includes nationalization of the banks in
its platform. The issue is a political one, and evaluation of it is beyond the scope of
this study.
41 For Canada, "total money supply" is defined as total Canadian deposits of the
chartered banks less interbank deposits, government deposits with the Bank of Canada,
and active note circulation. For the United States, "total money supply" has been
defined as adjusted demand deposits, time deposits, government deposits with the
Federal Reserve Banks, and active note circulation. For a detailed account of American
monetary expansion in wartime see Charles R. Whittlesey, op. cit.
42 "Circulating medium" for the United States is defined as total money supply less
time deposits, while for Canada it is defined as identical with total money supply.
51CHART V —CANADIANMONEY SUPPLY RISES 77%, AMERICAN 104%
* Adjusteddemand deposits plus government deposits with central banks.
Sources: Canada —Bankof Canada, Statistical Summary; United States —Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
rate of increase of 2 percent in the United States is nearly twice that
in Canada.
Bank of Canada note circulation swelled from $180 million to
$'g'' million in this period, while chartered bank note circulation
dwindled from $millionto $7 million. This substitution of
central for chartered bank notes does not arise from war policy, but
from the requirement of the Bank of Canada Act of 1934 that
chartered bank note circulation should be gradually reduced so that
an upper limit of 25 percent of paid-up capital isreached by January
1945. The 350 percent growth of total active notecirculation is
greater than has occurred in the United States, but percapita cur-
rency circulation is still more than twice as great in theUnited States
as it is in Canada.
As pointed out.above, Canadian monetary expansion during the
first two years of war was partly. the result of deliberate financial
policy designed to speed mobilization of resources for war. In the
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0expansion exceeded the wishes of the Department of Finance. In his
budget speech of March 1943, the Finance Minister stated that dur-
ing the year "we shall have borrowed direct from the Bank of Can-
ada and the chartered banks a net amount of $983 million. That is
not all dangerous borrowing, for the public has desired to hold con-
siderable savings in cash, but most of it is borrowing which I would
rather not have done."
On Business
War has brought business less freedom but more profits. Priorities,
allocation of materials, manpower regulations, and the pressure of
wartime needs upon the total supply of credit mean that few enter-
prises other than war industries have been permitted to undertake
expansion. These restrictions, together with high taxes on corporate
income and the excess profits tax, tend to limit new investment in
fields lacking direct or indirect government support, making further
control of the capital market unnecessary. On the other hand, the
high level of government expenditures, combined with the increase
in total consumer spending, has resulted in higher earnings for war
industries and peace industries alike.
The usual rate of profit allowed under war contracts has been
5 percent of total cost of production. Under the "target price" con-
tract which was in most general use for new products earlier in the
war, the cost estimate was usually the Briçish price plus io or 20
percent, which was expected to yield the 5 percent profit to the
Canadian manufacturer. If costs proved higher than this estimate,
the contractor absorbed 25 percent of the excess, the government
the rest. If costs were lower than estimated, the contractor kept 25
percent of the saving as additional profit, and passed on the rest to
the government as a reduction in price. For commodities which
were in production before the war, firm price contracts established
by competitive bidding were usual, but sometimes "ceiling prices,"
subject to downward revision only, were used. "Cost plus percentage
of cost" contracts were negotiated only as a last resort and were care-
fully checked. After four years of war most contracts could be let on
a "firm price" basis. In addition, under these war contracts, depre-
ciation may be accelerated for tax purposes to rates high enough to
write off the entire investment over the expected duration of the
53war, provided that the plant has no prospect of peacetime utility.4'
However, despite high taxes, most concerns up to ifared bet-
ter than they did in peacetime. For the 484 companies with assets
of more than $500thousand,net income to stockholders (after pro-
vision for taxes) amounted to9 percent of stockholders' investment
in 1939, 10percentin 1941,slightlyless in 1942. Figures for these
companies plus more than ioo smaller concerns are presented in
Table i8. In 1942 net profits before taxes were 8o percent above the
1939 level, and about double the 1936-39 average. Even net profits
after taxes were over 15percenthigher than in 1939and29 percent
higher than the 1936-39 average. Statements for 1943 will probably
show profits before taxes higher than ever, but profits net of taxes
somewhat below the prewar level, since for the first time the pro-
vision of the 1942 tax law will have been applicable over the whole
year.
The effect on profits has by no means been uniform for all indus-
trial groups. In 1942, net income to stockholders of railways was up
500percent,of pulp and paper companies 240 percent, of machinery
and rubber companies nearly 140 percent, of retail service concerns
129percent,of iron and steel and electrical equipment companies
59 percent, above the 1936-39 average. On the other hand, profits
of gold mining firms fell 31 percent, of petroleum and coal com-
panies 30percent,of printing and publishing concerns 8 percent,
of tobacco companies 6 percent below "standard" prewar profits. Of
course, some of the larger percentage increases in profits were made
from a small or negligible base. The pulp and paper companies, for
example, had been in difficulties throughout most of the thirties.
This rise in earnings has been accompanied by an increase in the
working capital liquidity of Canadian corporations, as is shown by
the figures for depreciation and undistributed profits in Table i8,
and by the selected current items in Table i9. In addition to these
factors, there has been a net retirement of corporate bonds of more
than $230 million since the war began.
Effects of war on working capital have been much the same for all
industrial groups. Among the major industries, only public utilities
43Fora more complete account of the handling of war contracts, see Lionel Chevrier
(Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Munitions and Supply), Hansard (June 15,
1943); Henry Borden, "The Work of the Department of Munitions and Supply,"
Parkinson (editor), Canadian War Economics (Toronto, 1941).




1 Year Nearest to Calendar Year
Average 1939 1940 1941 1942
Net operating profit (before
depreciation) $502 $565 $715 $905$1,013
Less: depreciation, deferred development
andpatentwrite-offs 123 135 162 206 264
Investment and other non-operating
income (net) 56 54 49 55 53
Less: bond interest (including exchange
and amortizatiOn of discount) 78 77 77 75 74
Net profit before income and excess
profits tax provision 357 407 525 679 728
Less: income and excess prfits tax
provision (excluding refundable
portion) 63 79 188 299 349b
Net income to stockholdersc 294 328 337 380 379
Less: forced saving (refundable
portion of excess profits tax) .. .. .. .. 19
Net income available for dividendsc 294 328 337 380. 360
Ne income paid Out in cash dividends 230 240 239 239 233
Undistributed income (excluding
forced saving)c 64 88 98 141 127
Source: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary (October-November 1943).
a Compiled by the Bank of Canada. The sample includes all companies with 1941
assets over $500,000 which publish reports or file them with the Companies Branch of
the Department of the Secretary of State, plus over 100 smaller companies whose
reports were available on the same basis. For the 628 companies, net income to stock-
holders in recent years appears to be about two-thirds of the total for all companies.
The table is, of course, subject to all the limitations and qualifications which apply to
the basic accounting statements.
bTheincreased rate of excess profits tax (and forced saving) imposed in the 1942
Budget did not go into force until July 1, 1942, and consequently the effect over a full
year will not be apparent until 1943 statements are available,
c For purposes of comparability any special capital charges made against income
account in company reports have been added back, as well as special inventory reserve
provision amounting to 2.5, 8.3, 14.6, 5.2 in the years 1939 to 1942 respectively. Deple-
tion charges have been added back into "net income to stockholders" for the years
1936 to 1942 respectively as follows: pulp and paper, 1.3,1.7, L4, 1.0, 2.0, 2.0 and
2.0; other non-ferrous metals, 2.3, 3.6, 3.3, 3.6, 3.9, 4.2 and 4.0; coal and petroleum,
.5,.8,.8,.3,.4,.5 and .5. Thus, in these cases, and in other cases such as gold mining,
where depletion has not been charged inthe accounting statements, profits are
overstated to the extent that no deductions are made for these factors. Included also is
current bond interest earned but not paid in cash of 2.2, 2.4, .6, 1.7, 2.4, 2.3 and 1.9
in the years 1936 to 1942 respectively.













Bank loans 22.5 29.0 53.4
Source: The Financial Post (June 13, 1942) p. 4.
aIncludesgovernment bonds.
and construction firms seem to have suffered a net reduction of work-
ing capital during the war period. Such returns as are available for
1942 and '943 suggest that cash holdings were somewhat below the
1941 level, but that investments in marketable securities plus inven-
tories were up an amount which is considerably larger. Working
capital was above the 1941 figures for almost all categories of
corporations.
The total increase in corporate holdings of government bonds
alone exceeded the entire investment in war plants at the end of
1943andthe refundable portion of excess profits is expected to sur-
pass $ioo million per year. Consequently, it is quite possible that
corporations will be less in need of bank credit and security flota-
tions at the end of the war than they were before it began. Much
depends, however, upon such factors as the extent of postponed re-
placements and repairs of plant and equipment in peacetime in-
dustries, the extent to which war plant and equipment can be con-
verted, accrued tax liability, postwar changes in wage and price
levels, and the like. If an unexpectedly large demand for investment
funds develops, the present strong working capital position of cor-
porations should improve their ability to borrow, even in face of
temporary readjustment losses.
On Life Insurance Companies
The changed composition of Canadian life insurance companies'
portfolios since war began is illustrated by Table 20. The biggest
change is clearly in holdings of Dominion obligations, while the
largest percentage increase is found in "United States and other"
securities. These are mainly American securities, and the enlarged
holdings probably arise from state insurance regulations requiring
56TABLE 20 —PORTFOLIOS OF CANADIAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES, 1939 D 1942
(dollar figures in millions)
Bonds and Debentures
Central







1939 $269 $112 $138 $108 $59 $686
1942 526 189 126 121 54 1,016
% Change +96%+69% —9%+12% — 8%+48%
British and Colonial
1939 $112 .. $77 .. .. $189
1942 189 .. 74 - . 263
% Change +69% .. —4% .. .. +39%
United States and Other
1939 $58 -. $21 $140 $14 $233
1942 126 6 205 86 373
% Change +117% -. — 71%+46%+ 157%+60%
All Countries
1939 $439 $112 $236 $248 $73 $1,108
















1939 $101 $305 $247 $305 $59 $2,276
1942 92 92 221 277 31 2,653
%Change —9%—70%—11%—9%—48%+17%
Source: Superintendent ot Insurance.
a Includes real estate held under agreements of sale.
the American liabilities against Canadian companies to be covered
substantjally by American assets. Some substitution of public utili-
ties and industrials for municipals has taken place within the Ameri-
can portfolio, which may reflect an effort to sustain earnings despite
the obligation the companies feel to subscribe to low-yield American
war loans. British and Colonial holdings show a much smaller in-
crease, which is concentrated in central government securities.
With the wartime rise in national income, policy loans have fallen
off. Thus, high tax rates have not changed the usual inverse cor-
57relation pf volume of such loans with national income.44 Annual
charges on policy loans have been maintained at 6 percent, and the
general attitude of the companies is to discourage borrowing on
policies because of the high percentage of cancellations of policies
on which loans have been extended. Holdings of stocks show a
moderate decline, and this development may be the result of limi-
tations imposed by the Insurance Law of Canada upon purchases of
stocks. Real estate and mortgage loans fell 70 percent, and depletion
of cash reserves amounted to 48 percent between 1939 and 1942.
Availablereturns for 1943 show a further increase in the share of
government bonds in total assets, and a drop in virtually all other
classes of assets.
One result of the growing share of central government securities
in the investment portfolios of Canadian life insurance companies
has been a continuation of the prewar decline in rates of earnings
on ledger assets. This decline has taken place despite greatly im-
proved collections on western mortgages as the war has brought
prosperity to agriculture. As Table 21 shows, earnings have failed to
TABLE21 —EARNINGSAND ASSETS OF CANADIAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES, 1937 AND 1939-42
(dollar figures in millions)
Change
Item 1937 1939 1940 1941 1942 1939—42
Total ledger assetsa $2,065 $2,276$2,379$2,508$2,653 12%
Interest, dividends
and rents $89 $94 $96 $102 $104 10
Earnings on ledger assets 4.56%. 4.32%4.24%4.24%4.13%—4
Insurance in force
in Canada $4,305 $4,470$4,609$4,836$5,185 16
Source: Superintendent of Insurance.
aTotalassets less accrued interest, dividends, and rents.
keep pace with the expansion of assets and liabilities. However, the
decline in rate of earnings has been less rapid than in the immediate
prewar years. Returns for 1943 show a further drop in the rate of
return on the insurance company assets.
44 See Gottfried Haberler, Consumer Instalment Credit and Economic Fluctuations
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942) pp. 110-14.
58While rising incomes would have led to some increase of insur-
ance in force in any case, it seems likely that income tax provisions
regaiding life insurance are partly responsible for this growth. Many
people have preferred to put their savings into insurance rather than
into refundable taxes. The percentage growth of liabilities during
the war has exceeded the growth of earnings, and has outrun the
percentage rise in premiums paid, by a considerable margin.
The insurance companies may face some complicated investment
problems whether the war is followed by a depression or by a boom.
In a depression, rents, interest on mortgages, and dividends on stocks
fall off; deficit-financed public work and social security projects
might mean continued pressure on insurance companies to buy gov-
ernment bonds. These developments would have adverse effects on
earnings. Restrictions on investment limit participation in a boom,
and the price of bonds may decline. Portfolios cannot be rearranged
quickly enough for earnings to keep pace with general business ac-
tivity and improved investment opportunities. In addition, the pat-
tern of interest rates may reverse itself in a boom, so that yields are
higher on short-term, as they were in the late twenties. These con-
ditions would require shifts among types of maturities and invest-
ment different from those generally practiced.
While the lag in mortality tables used for calculating insurance
premiums behind actual mortality rates provides some margin of
safety, the decline in yields must eventually force insurance com-
panies to seek new fields for investment, raise premiums, or lower
dividends. Housing, industrial expansion, and foreign loans are
among the new investment possibilities discussed. Other investors
have their eyes on these fields, however, and whether there will be
opportunities for all funds seeking profitable investment remains
to be seen. Foreign lending and reconversion financing may prove
no safer than purchase of common stocks.
Insurance companies are aTready the chief lenders under the
National Housing Act, which permits a comparatively high rate to
the lender and charges a moderate rate to the borrower, since the
government assumes part of the mortgage. A system of pooling plus
government underwriting makes these loans virtually riskiess for
the insurance companies, and it is highly unlikely that direct in-
vestment in housing projects will prove more attractive than in-
direct investment under the present Housing Act. There is some
59feeling, however, that, the burden of supporting the insurance com-
panies should be on policyholders rather than on householders,
and a revised Housing Act may be less generous to lenders than the
present one.
The most probable development, if no way is found to sustain
earnings, is a rise in premiums on new policies or a reduction in divi-
dends (which amounts to much the same thing since policyholders
participate in the earnings of most companies). Dividends paid to
shareholders fell from $1.5 million to $1.4 million from 1939 to
1942. If insurance premiums are raised, it is improbable that people
will reduce the size of their policies precisely enough to keep total
premiums paid a constant proportion of their incomes. The declin-
ing rate of returns on insurance company investments in itself would
probably result in some slight increase in the ratio of savings to
national income.45
On Retail Finance Companies
Consumer Credit Regulations have been in force only since October
1941. Their effects are hard to disentangle from effects of limitations
on production and of rising incomes, but there is evidence that they
have been successful in restricting sales of consumers' durable goods.
Table 22 presents evidence that cash sales by department stores,
TABLE 22—DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER CREDIT, 1941-43
Type of Store
Jan.—June 1943in% of June 1941
PERCENT OF TOTAL SALES InstalmentCharge
InstalmentAccountsAccounts Cash Instalment
SalesReceivable Receivable 1941a1943a 1941a1943a
Department 63% 38% 83% 68%75% 15%8%
Clothing 96 65 71 59 67 18 13
Furniture 60 38 75 23 39 61 40
Jewelry 46 29 66 48 61 22 9
Source: WPTB, Research Division, Statistics Branch (most, but not all of these figures
are published in the Report of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, April 1, 1943-
December 31, 1943, pp. 44-45).
ajanuary to June.
45 Nationalization of life insurance, as well as banking, is proposed by the Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation party. As in the case of banks, evaluation of this proposal
is beyond the scope of this study.
6oclothing, house furnishings and jewelry concerns have increased
relative to total sales, while instalment sales have fallen off both
relatively and absolutely. Charge accounts outstanding have also
declined. The fact that instalment accounts receivable have fallen
more than instalment sales shows that collections have exceeded
new instalment sales. According to the WPTB, these same trends
are observable in all areas of Canada.40
Retail credit is closely tied to those consumer durable goods which
have been most severely limited. New sales of automobiles fell from
$8 million in December 1941 to $6oo thousand in December 1942,
and total number of cars financed, new and used, fell from 7,loo to
2,500. New credit extended for buying automobiles fell from $mil-
lion to $500 thousand. Similarly, radio sales fell from $' million in
the third quarter of 1941. tO $31/n million in the third quarter of
1942. It seems clear that retail finance companies must expect a
distinctly reduced volume of business for the duration, because of
reduced output of consumer durables and restrictions on consumer
credit.
On Provincial and Municipal Governments
Table 23 shows some of the differences in the financial policies of
provincial and municipal governments for the two war periods.
TABLE 23— PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL FINANCEa
(in millions)
Item 1913 1921Change 1939 1912bChange
Currentexpenditures $147 $296 $149 $601 $597 $—74
Currentrevenue 155 320 165 571 658 87
Debt 790 1,436 646 3,400 3,128 —272
Sources: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary, various issues, and Royal Commission
on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report, Book I, pp. 105-07.
a Unfortunately, no municipal figures are available for the period of War I. Provin-
cial expenditures rose from $57.1 million in 1914 to $66 million in 1918, receipts from
$51.7 to $69.3 million. Municipal expenditures were clearly a much more important
factor than provincial.
bBudgetestimates. -
Duringthe first war, the provinces and municipalities made capital
outlays on public works and welfare and as a consequence there was
46Reportof the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, April 1, 1913-December 31, 1913,
p. 45.
47DBS,Monthly Review of Business Statistics.
6ia large ris in their combined debt, while in the present war, they
have adopted fiscal policies which on the whole are counter-infla-
tionary. [n addition to the items shown in the table, provincial, and
local governments reduced their bank indebtedness by $6o million
and subscribed $8o million to the first three Victory Loans during
the period. Estimates for 1943showa small current surplus, and a
further contraction of debt by $52millionfor municipalities, while
net retirements of municipal bonds amounted to $23millionin the
first half of the year. The adoption of contractionist policies by pro-
vincial and local governments in a large measure is the result of
Federal policies, which have reduced relief loads, made public work
expenditures well-nigh impossible, and increased revenues.
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